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NORTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY
 AND CHINA’S ROLE
By MEN Jing and Gustaaf Geeraerts (Belgium)
At the end of the Cold War, the bipolar structure dissolved. The Soviet
Union was disintegrated, while the United States remained as the only
superpower in the world. Such dramatic changes not only have a strong impact
on the international environment, but also exert a direct influence on the regional
situation, particularly Northeast Asia, whereby the superpowers used to be
active in the competition of their influence. With the relaxation of the superpower
competition, the countries in this region are allowed to focus their attention on
economic development. Compared to the Cold War period when the region was
characterized by the competition and conflict, it is now witnessing growing
economic cooperation and political dialogue between the countries. Except for
the nuclear development of North Korea, the Northeast Asian region has been
comparatively stable and peaceful in the post-Cold War era. China takes
advantage of the favorable external environment, and continues its economic
reform and open policy. Buttressed by its rapid economic growth, China expands
its influence both in the region and in the world.
Currently in the Northeast Asia, the influence of Russia is not comparable
to that of the former Soviet Union. Haunted by its domestic problems, Russia
spares very limited energy to the regional issues. Japan, as a leading industrial
country in the world, is regarded rather as a US ally and dependant than as an
independent strategic player in the region.1  The regional security, in other
words, is most directly affected by the policy and behavior of two countries:
the United States and China. Although an outside power, the US plays a unique
role in the region: balancing against the Soviet Union in the Cold War era, and
balancing against China in the post-Cold War era. Its active involvement in the
regional issues of Asia is due to its assessment of the importance of the region
for its national interest. As the secretary of the state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs has said, “Asia is the key to the economic health of the United States
and to the everyday lives of Americans,” and “the United States’ interests in
Asia have been remarkably consistent over the past two centuries: peace and
1Barry Buzan “Security Architecture in Asia: the Interplay of Regional and Global
Levels,” The Pacific Review, Vol.16, No.2, p.151
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security; commercial access to the region; freedom of navigation; and the
prevention of the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition”2.
As an indigenous in the region, China attracts increasing attention from
its neighbors as well as from the United States. China has put economic
development on top of its national agenda since the implementation of reform
and open policy at the end of the 1970s. The diplomatic task has been to create
and maintain favorable external environment for the economic growth. Guided
by the economic goal, China has been experiencing an evolution in its diplomatic
relations with this outside world. It has established official diplomatic
relationship with more than 180 countries and regions and joined most of the
important global and regional organizations.
The virtual removal of the Soviet Union/Russia at the end of the Cold War
has helped to strengthen China’s influence in regional development. Due to its
military modernization and the noticeable increase of its military budget, the
perspective of a “China threat” was becoming widely spread at the beginning
of the 1990s. In order to counter the negative influence of “China threat”,
Beijing has remarkably improved its relationship with other major powers and
notably increased its participation in multilateral organizations. With such
endeavor, it intends to establish an image of a responsible power and
demonstrate to the world that the rise of China would not pose security threat
to others. As pointed out by Wang Yizhou, deputy director of the Institute of
World Economics and Politics of China Academy of Social Sciences, China’s
foreign policy is transforming from inward-looking, mainly concerned about its
own development, to outward-looking, concerned both about its own
development and the development of the whole population in the world.3
Recently, Chinese government encourages Chinese scholars to develop
a theoretical basis for the diplomatic policy of “China’s peaceful rise”4. The
new theory aims at easing the anxiety of other countries at the rise of China by
making known to the world that the goal of China’s rise is to “build an all-round
well-of society” internally and to “maintain world peace and promote common
development” externally. In this way, Chinese government intends to show to
2 Quoted in Alexander A. Sergounin, “An Age of Uncertainty: Building a Post-Cold War
U.S. Security Strategy for East and Southeast Asia,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies,
Summer 1996, Vol.15, No.2, p.2
3 “Zhongguo waijiao qiaoran zhuanxing” (China’s diplomacy Are Experiencing Quiet
Changes), March 1, 2004, see http://news.creaders.net/headline/newsPool/1A195646.html
4 Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “China Aiming for ‘Peaceful Rise’,” CNN, Feb.6, 2004, see
http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/asiapcf/02/02/willy.column/
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the world that China’s rise benefits the world5. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
said at the 2nd Plenum of the 10th National People’s Congress in March 2004,
“China does not and will not seek hegemony.”6
China’s relationship with the U.S is featured by both “competition and
cooperation.” In order to promote its own national interest, the U.S tries to
engage China as a rising power. Also due to the problems in the bilateral relations
including trade frictions, the Taiwan issue, and the human rights issue, the
development of the U.S-China relations are not without troubles. Motivated by
its economic incentives, Chinese government seeks to avoid direct conflict
with the U.S government. Particularly after September 11, 2001, the cooperation
between the two sides has been remarkably strengthened, leading to a more
optimistic security situation in Northeast Asia.
In order to examine how the Northeast Asian security situation has
developed and will develop in the near future with reference to China’s role in
the region, the paper is divided into three parts: firstly, we will examine the
bipolar structure with the US as one pole and China as the other in Northeast
Asia in the post-Cold War era, to find out whether such structure will evoke
conflicts or support stability. Secondly, by studying how China’s role and
identity have been changing in the post-Cold war era, we will explore whether
such changes will obstruct or benefit regional peace. Finally, based on the
analysis of the first two parts, we will make the conclusion that China’s rise is in
favor of keeping a stable Northeast Asia.
The bipolar structure in Northeast Asia
The fall of the Soviet power at the end of the Cold War changed the power
structure in Northeast Asia. While a number of scholars claim that today’s
power structure in the region is multipolar,7     we, following Robert Ross, argue
5 Wang Yiwei, “China’s Rise Benefits the World,” China daily, March 2, 2004, p.6
6 “Wen Jiabao: Zhongguo de jueqi bucunzai renhe weixie” (The Rise of China Doesn’t
Exist Any Threat to Others), March 15, 2004, see http://news.creaders.net/headline/
newsPoll/14A196875.html
7See for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” International Security, Vol.18,
No.3, Winter 1993/94, pp.5-34; Richard K.Betts, “Wealth, Power an Instability: East Asia
and the United States after the Cold war,” International Security, Vol.18, No.3, Winter
1993/94, pp.34-77; Kent e.Calder, Asia’s Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth
Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific (London: Nicholas Breeley Publishing, 1996); Charles
A.Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of
Stable Multipolarity,” International Security, Vol.23, No.2, Fall 1998, pp.40-79
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that it is bipolar.8  Contrary to the viewpoint that the rise of China indicates a
fundamental shift in the balance of power,9 we maintain that China’s rise will not
pose a threat to the security of Northeast Asia. The interaction between the
two poles of the United States and China in the region will not likely create the
conditions conducive to major wars.
In the post-Cold War era, China has gained a much more independent
strategic position in the region. This has given China more influence to affect
the regional security.10 Compared to the 1980s when China was the weakest in
the triangle game with the two superpowers; the 1990s witnessed the rise of
China and the decline of Russia in power. To a certain degree, China was “the
major strategic beneficiary” 11 consequent to the split of the Soviet Union.
China filled the vacuum wherever the Soviet influence declined. On the other
hand, supported by its allies in the region including Japan and South Korea
and backed up by its military superiority, the United States acts as an external
power. The presence of more than 80,000 US troops based in Japan, South
Korea, and the deployment of the Seventh Fleet in the Pacific, constitute the
largest non-NATO American forces outside the United States and the great
bulk of American troops in the entire Pacific.12    In order to protect its strategic
interests, the US is closely involved in the regional issues of Northeast Asia.
Although the United States enjoys a hegemonic position in the world, it
confronts its most formidable rival and potential great power challenge-China
in Northeast Asia. In this region, peace and prosperity maintained with the
presence of great power rivalry and traditional balance of power politics.13
8 In contrast to multipolar argument, some other scholars hold that the region is
bipolar. Among them, see Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the
Twenty-first Century,” International Security, Vol.23, No.4, Spring 1999, pp.81-118;
Joon N.Mak, “The Asia-Pacific Security Order,” in Anthony McGrew and Christopher
Brook (eds.), Asia-Pacific in the New World Order (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 88-120
9 See for example, Richard Bernstein and Riss H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with
China (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1997); Evan A.Feigenbaum, “China’s Challenge to
Pax Americana,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol.24, No.3, Summer 2001, pp.31-43;
Thomas J.Christensen, “Posing Problem without Catching Up,” International Security,
Vol.25, No.4, Spring 2001, pp.5-40
10Wu Xinbo, “Changing roles: China and the United States in East Asian Security,”
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol.15, No.1, Spring 1996, p.2
11Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,”
International Security, Vo.23, No.4, p.84
12Kent E.Calder, “The New Face of Northeast Asia,” foreign Affairs, Vol.80, No.1,
January/February 2001, p.117
13Robert S.Ross,”The U.S.-China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of influence,
and the peace of East Asia,” paper prepared for the international conference on East Asia,
Latin America, and the “New Pax Americana”, Feb.14-15, 203,p.1
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As an external power in the region, the presence of the United States is
demonstrated by its naval supremacy. Its resources and technology regarding
the development and deployment of the advanced weapons in the region dwarfs
the efforts of China’s military build-up. China’s naval modernization may
enhance its coastal security, but may not grant it the power projection capability
to challenge the US hegemony at sea. On the other hand, the US’s power and
flexibility in this region are constrained in the sense that it is incapable to
project dominant power onto the mainland. In contrast, China has an
overwhelming dominance on the mainland. As Ross points out, “China’s status
as a continental power not only reflects geography but also the culture of land
power.”14   Territorial expansion was motivated by the purpose of seeking arable
land in history. Territorial threat came also mainly from the neighbors on the
continent. Therefore, it is essential for the Chinese to secure the borders on its
entire land periphery. The reform and open policy carried out since the end of
the 1970s has remarkably increased China’s economic capacity, which allowed
the country to modernize its forces. Through the construction of “pocket of
excellence”, the improvement of training and education, the purchase of
relatively advanced weaponry from the international market, China has enhanced
its military capabilities. The large infantry and the rapidly developed naval and
air forces, make China a land-based power which is orienting toward the sea.
Great power rivalry is not necessarily characterized by heightened
tensions, wars and crisis.15 As a maritime power in the region, the U.S. is satisfied
at keeping the status quo position and ensuring the regional shipping lanes.
Whereas China as a continental power, strives to maintain a long-term stable
strategic status quo on its land borders to divert substantial resources to naval
modernization. To a certain degree, whether the region will be peaceful and
stable depends on whether China will be able to challenge the U.S. maritime
power.16 Such a scenario is rather unlikely. First, China remains vigilant to the
threats at its border. Sharing borders with thirteen countries on the continent,
China is obliged to give considerable attention to the security of the borderlines.
Second, even if China would divert substantial resources to develop its naval
power, it could not easily approach parity with the U.S. navy. China remains a
long way off from being able to seriously challenge the United States. Although
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its conventional forces appear formidable on paper, in reality the PRC’s ability
to project power beyond the Chinese border is severely limited.17 Even if Chinese
navy were strong enough to complicate U.S. navy, it would avoid to strike first
for fear of a fatal retaliatory strike from the U.S.  which would destroy its navy18.
Since none of the two poles has the power or the intention to challenge the
other in its sphere of dominance, the power structure of the region remains
rather stable.19
There is no doubt that Russia and Japan are important in regional issues.
However, in comparison to the two poles in the region, the influence of Russia
and Japan is rather limited. During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union tried
to challenge the American maritime superiority by establishing a presence of
the Pacific Fleet in East Asian waters. But now due to the capital shortage,
Russian navy consists of dated vessels in need of repair. In addition, apart from
the domestic problems of economic development and political stability, Russia’s
geography remains a major obstacle to its presence in Northeast Asia. Originally
developed out of Eastern Europe, Russia seems not likely to devote its limited
resources to gaining a polar status in Northeast Asia.20
Both during the Cold war era and the post-Cold War era, Japan has
committed itself as an ally of the United States. Its dedication has not only
reduced the maritime challenge to the U.S. power, but also helps increase “the
U.S. ability to depend on Japan to expand its own regional military power.”21
Apart from its dependent status on the United States, its small size and the lack
of the strategic resources frustrate its ambition as a regional pole.22 As a result;
its most likely role is to adhere to the status quo.23
17 Thomas Berger, “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East
Asia,” Review of International Studies, Vol.26, 2000, pp.411-412
18 Robert Ross, “The geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,”
p.106
19 Here we refer the low profile approach adopted by the two governments of the
United States and China in their solution of the bombing of Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia
and the spy plane incident.
20Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,”
pp.89-90
21 Robert S.Ross, “The U.S.-China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of influence,
and the Peace of East Asia,” p.4
22 Robert Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century,”
pp.90-91
23 Barry Buzan “Security Architecture in Asia: the Interplay of Regional and Global
Levels,” p.167
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Thus, the bipolar peace in the region “reflects the ability of China and the
United States to dominate the local powers in their respective spheres.”24 The
negotiations on the North Korean nuclear weapon programs demonstrate how
the security crisis has been dealt with in the bipolar structure of Northeast
Asia. Washington demands that North Korea should abandon nuclear programs
“fully, verifiably and irreversibly.”25 It prefers to rely on coercive diplomacy to
obtain North Korean concessions, but it has limited leverage against the regime
of Kim Jong ll. acting as the strategic and economic benefactor of North Korea,
China enjoys the leverage that no other countries have in dissuading North
Korea from pursuing a nuclear power status. Different from Washington, Beijing
is in favor of seeking a negotiated solution to the crisis.26 Affected by China’s
stance, the negotiations have continued, first with the four-party talk, then
with the six-party talk involving the regional powers of both Russia and Japan.
Although there are no tangible results from the six-party negotiations, the
Bush Administration has moved to the position that the policy towards North
Korea should be based on diplomatic negotiation rather than pre-emptive military
actions as carried out in Iraq. North Korea has shown its interest in continuing
diplomatic talks after the Bush Administration expressed its willingness to
consider the security guarantee to the current Pyongyang regime.
U.S. versus China: rivals and partners
The United States as the hegemonic power eager to defend its
unchallengeable position, and China as a rising power ready to increase its
influence, are bound to be rivals. Nevertheless, the relationship between the
two is not exclusively zero-sum. Rather different from the competitive relations
between the superpowers during the Cold War period, the Sino-U.S. relationship
is characterized by both competition and cooperation. There exist common
interests between the two. While they compete for their strategic influence,
they cooperate to maintain regional peace and stability.
In the Sino-U.S. relationship, it seems unavoidable that a stronger China
potentially poses new types of hazards to American interest, regardless of
24 Robert S.Ross, “The U.S.-China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of influence,
and the Peace of East Asia,” p.2
25 Ralph A.Cossa, “North Korea: the Brittle Prospects for Six Party Talks,” International
Herald Tribune, Nov.25, 2003, see http://www.iht.com/articles/118849.html
26 Robert S.Ross, “The U.S.-China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of influence,
and the Peace of East Asia,” pp.19-21
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Chinese intentions. The U.S. is inclined to oppose the rise of major powers in a
region of its vital interest. The rise of China, therefore, implies certain inevitable
threat to the U.S. goals. 27 Moreover, as history shows, the rise of country to
great power status has more than once led to war. Confronting the “China
threat,” the U.S. hesitated between the choice of containment and engagement
policy, and did not make it clear until the Clinton Administration made the
decision to establish the partnership with China in 1997. As pointed out by
Lieberthal, it is in the interest of the U.S. to develop a strategic approach that
focuses on the essentials of mutually beneficial relationship, and to integrate
China into Asia and the global political system.28 Nevertheless, despite the
partnership with China, Washington is afraid that if it reduces its security
engagement in the region, it might encourage Chinese hegemonism,29 therefore,
it continues to insist on the need for a permanent American military presence in
Asia.30
At the side of China, “even if its attitude towards the U.S. is comparatively
benign, China’s interests will never be perfectly aligned with America’s. As
China grows in power, its preferences will carry greater weight, and its influence
on issues over which Beijing and Washington disagree will increase at American
expense.”31 China needs to develop. Such development includes multi-
dimensional efforts. As an article published in Chinese newspaper claims, “China
has a major responsibility to oppose hegemonism and safeguard world peace.
We must increase our weight in stabilizing the world situation and this weight
is composed of various factors, such a political, economic, and military affairs.
Without sufficient military power, it will be impossible to preserve and enhance
China’s status as a big power.”32
It is not easy for China to balance among the three goals in its diplomacy:
not to submit to U.S. hegemony, or to allow the U.S. to dominate Asia; not to be
27 Denny Roy, “Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent hazards,”
Orbis, Vol.47, No.1, Winter 2003, p.125
28 Kenneth Lieberthal, “A New China Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.74, No.6,
November/December 1995, p.36, and p.38
29 Barry Buzan “Security Architecture in Asia: the Interplay of Regional and Global
Levels,” p.165
30 William Pfaff, “The question of hegemony,” foreign Affairs, Vol.80, No.1, January/
February 2001, p.228.
31 Denny Roy, “Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent hazards,”p.126
32 Zhang Guanjun, “The National Defense Concept and the Army’s historical
Responsibility in the New Period,” Jiefangjun bao (PLA Daily), July 17, 1987, quoted in
Yitzhak Shichor, “Defense Policy Reform,” p.91
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drawn into a direct confrontation with the U.S., or be construed as a rival to the
U.S.; to increase its standing in international society generally and its integration
into the world economy in particular.33 The first two goals are closely related to
China’s U.S. foreign policy. The first reflects China’s ambition to balance against
the U.S., and the second   indicates China’s intention to maintain peace and
stability in the region. The third goal reveals China’s pursuit of its economic
interest. China needs to maintain its economic ties with the outside world by
integrating itself to the international society. To avoid being dominated by the
U.S., and in the mean time to ameliorate the relationship with it are important for
China to keep its influential position in the Northeast Asia and to create a
favorable environment for its economic development. As Jiang Zemin called at
his visit to Washington 1997, the two sides should “expand common
understanding, increase trust, reduce differences, and jointly create a future.”34
Despite the possibility that the rise of China diminishes the previously
commanding influence of the U.S., a cooperative Sino-U.S. relationship is not
ruled out. As Roy argues, if the rising power brings expanded trade and
investment opportunities and promises to contribute to the management of
peace and stability, it is “less unwelcome.”35  In the two decades and more
period of China’s economic reform, Chinese foreign trade has grown at a rate of
more than 15 percent annually, twice as fast as world trade over the same
period.36 As a result, Chinese trading position has risen substantially. From
thirty-second in world trade in 1978, China became the fifteenth in the list of the
world’s top trading countries in 1989, the tenth in 1997, the sixth in 2001, and the
fifth in 2002.37
The rapid growth of foreign trade as well as the large number of trading
partners from both socialist and capitalist countries and developed and
developing countries suggest a more flexible and open approach of the
development in China. In contrast to the 1950s when most of the Chinese
trading partners were communist countries, over 80 percent of foreign trade is
33 Barry Buzan “Security Architecture in Asia: the Interplay of Regional and Global
Levels,” p.161
34 Liaowang (Outlook), Newsweek, No.45, 1997, p.5
35 Denny Roy, “Rising China and U.S. Interests: Inevitable vs. Contingent hazards,”p.126
36 Alan Hunter and John Sexton, Contemporary China (Houndmills, Hampshire and
London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), p.85
37 “Zhongguo chao Yingguo cheng diwuda maoyiguo” (China Exceeded the Britain and
Becomes Number 5 in Total Volume of Trade in the World), see http://news.creaders.net/
headline/newsPool/30A167467.html
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with non-communist partners in the reform era.38 Compared to the 1950s when
only sixty and more countries and regions had trade relations with China, the
number increased to one hundred and eighty in 1980 and two hundred and
twenty seven in 1998.39
The rapid economic growth has remarkably increased the degree of
interdependence between China and the outside world. The Sino-U.S. trade
ties have developed fast over the last two decades and more and have become
an important aspect in the relationship between the two countries. The United
State is China’s second biggest trade partner while China is the fourth biggest
trade partner of the United States.
The Sino-U.S. trade rose by 30 percent on the basis of the volume of 2002
and reached US$ 126.33 billion in 2003. As the president and Chief Executive
Officer of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Thomas J. Donohue said, the U.S.
side is ready to work with China under the principle of “seeking common ground
while remaining different” to build up strategic trade and business relationship
of mutual benefit.40 In Northeast Asia, the US‘s two most important strategic
allies, Japan and South Korea, are particularly benefiting from China’s growth.
Japan’s imports from China surpassed those from the U.S. in 2002, while
Japanese exports to China surged by 39.3 percent. As to South Korea, the trade
relations with China is developing fast that China has become South Korea’s
largest trading partner by 2003.41
       In security and anti-terrorist issues, the cooperation between Beijing
and Washington has also been strengthened after the terrorist attack to the
World   Trade centre of New York on September 11, 2001. On September 20 and
21, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan visited the United States, expressing
the willingness to enhance dialogue and cooperation with the United States
concerning this issue. The governments of both countries then held expert
negotiations on anti-terrorism and other security issues in Washington and
Beijing. The common cause of combating terrorism brought the two countries
together. Bush has readjusted his China policy and treats China again as a
38 Robert Kleinberg, China’s “Opening” to the outside world: The Experiment with
Foreign Capitalism (Boulder, Colorado: West view Press, Inc., 1990), p.136
39 “Duiwai mayoi duoyuan kuoda” (Expansion of Foreign Trade), report by National
Statistic Bureau, see http://www.stats.gov.cn/tfx/ztfx/xzgwsnxlfxbg/200206050044.html
40 “Sino-U.S. economic & trade relations facing best opportunity: Wu Yi,” Dec.9,
2003, see http://www.biz-channel.com/php/news/news_detail.php?id=4378
41 Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders Find China a More Cordial Neighbour,” The New York
Times, October 18, 2003
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strategic partner. On October 19, President Jiang Zemin and President Bush met
at the ninth APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai, where they
exchanged views on bilateral ties, anti-terrorism and the maintenance of world
peace and stability. Bush stated that his administration made major revisions in
attitude toward China as a strategic competitive rival  during his election and
early days of presidency, and has since adopted a more pragmatic, rational and
active stance in its China policy. He said that he Considers China a friend of his
country, and that the United States will handle the differences between them
based on the principle of mutual respect and frankness.42 At the same meeting,
President Jiang advocated the establishment of a “high-level strategic dialogue
mechanism” that would encourage the presidents of both countries to exchange
ideas and communicate on important issues in a timely manner, either directly
or through their representatives, adding that China and United States can build
a “long-or medium-term anti-terrorism cooperative mechanism.”43
China: status quo power?
While studying power structure in the region, if it also necessary to examine
which way Chine will choose in its rise. The United States as a status quo
power, intends to maintain the order of the region so as to ensure its strategic
interest. In the competition of influence with the U.S., whether China identifies
itself as a revisionist or a status quo power will have direct impact on the
regional security. If China goes for the revisionist policy, its endeavor to change
the existent order will threaten the peace and stability of the region. If it chooses
a status quo position, it will contribute to maintain regional security. Therefore,
a close look at China’s identity is helpful to understand the security situation of
Northeast Asia.
China has experienced dramatic changes since the Communist regime
was established on the maintained in 1949. Rather than taking a static view on
China’s security practice, one should keep an eye on the changes, 44 and “the
potential for change offers ground for optimism about China’s future role in
guaranteeing regional stability.”45 China’s dependence on world economy, its
42 China Daily, October 19, 2001
43 Ibid
44 Wu Xinbo, “China: Security Practice of a Modernizing and Ascending Power”, in
Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice: Material Ideational Influence (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p.156
45 Evan A. Feigenbaum, “China’s Military Posture and the New economy Geopolitics,”
Survival, Vol.41, No.2, Summer 1999, p.74
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limited military capability, its intention to set up an image of a responsible
member in the world, and its newly developed approach relying more on common
security, lead to increasing cooperative behavior with the international
community on major-arms control arrangements as well as on tension-reducing
steps in relations with other countries. Such behavior reveals that China is
“gradually leaving its revolutionary oppositionist heritage behind.”46
Particularly in the latter part of the 1990s, with the increase of membership
in the international and regional organizations, we found significant changes in
China’s self-identify, its security concept, and its diplomatic relationship both
bilaterally and multilaterally. These changes affected China’s foreign policy,
and turned China from a revisionist power to a status quo power, which is not
only beneficial to China’s domestic development, but also favorable to the
maintenance of security and peace in the region and in the world.
Changing identity
National identity transmits “a sense of distinctiveness” 47 of the state in
the terms of its relations to others. Once the national identity is formed, it
serves as the fundamental idea of policymaking. Nevertheless, it is not a fixed
concept. The identity of a state is adjusted over time in the political and social
process of historical development. It is shaped by social change, especially
radical change such as “invasion, structural economic transformation and the
uprooting of established forms of life bring about”48 In the formation of national
identities, the external systemic factors take precedence in determining the
environment in which national identity enacts, whereas the past experiences
set out the basis tone.
The Chinese self-identity is closely linked to its past experience. History
is essential in the sense that it is “a process of change that leaves an imprint on
state identity.”49  What happened in the past and what accumulated as the
46 Mel Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China’s Security: the New Rules of the Military
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers), p.305
47 Michael Ng-Quinn, “national Identity in Premodern China: Formation and Role
Enactment,” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S.Kim, (eds.) China’s Quest for National
Identity (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p.33
48 Chris Farrands,”Society, Modernity and social Change: Approaches to Nationalism
and Identity,” in Jill Krause and Neil Renwick (eds.), Identities in International Relations
(London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p.3
49 Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspective on National Security,”
in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia
University, 1996), p.23
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experience shape the identification of China. National pride certainly has its
place in Chinese self-identity. In view of the Chinese, a country’s cultural
greatness determines its power in the world, so that a state with superior cultural
achievements was entitled to esteem and influence among other states.50  The
bitter experience subsequent to the Opium War shattered the self-superiority
and added self-interiority to China’s national identity. The unification of China
in 1949 not only marked the end of foreign devastation and domestic chaos but
also revitalized the efforts to resume China’s past glory.
Therefore, China has a dual identity: a strange combination of self-
superiority and self-interiority. It sometimes identifies itself as a glorious,
promising power in the international system, assuming that it acquires the
prestige and capability equitable to the status it asserts. It sometimes views
itself as a relatively weak, developing country, treated unequally in history by
the colonialists and their imperialists. It needs to redress the injustice.
The illustration of this dual identity is linked to the changes in the
international and domestic conditions. During the Cold War era, the conflicts
with superpowers as well as the ideologically oriented foreign policy facilitated
China’s identification with the developing countries. China stressed the shared
experience with these countries: “Both the Chinese people and the people of
these countries have for a long time been subjected to the oppression and
exploitation of imperialism and have suffered long enough.”51  Standing together
with the Asian, African, and Latin American countries, China intended to promote
revolution all over the world so as to transform the international order. The
relaxation of the international environment at the end of the Cold War, and the
mission of Chinese leaders to bring power and prosperity to the country
motivated Chinese government to improve the relations with the big powers
and to join the great power club.
Currently, China’s great power identity overshadows its identity as the
victim of Western expansion in the 19th century. While managing to keep friendly
relationship with all the countries in the world in general, China pays special
efforts in its relationship with the United States, European Union, Russia and
Japan. The partnership established with these countries in the late 1990s
50 Akira Iriye, “Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations,”
diplomatic History No.2, 1979, pp.118-119
51 Chu June-fu, “Foreign Relations of New China during the Past Five Years,” World
Culture, October 5, 1954, quoted in Joseph Camilleri, Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist
Era and its Aftermath (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980), p.82
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demonstrates China’s changing identity and its aspiration to the great power
status, and conforms to China’s policy to promote the multipolar structure in
the post-Cold War era.  Such policy not only creates for China a favorable
external environment, but also improves both China’s international status and
image. The identification with the leading powers in the world also reflects
China’s changes from transforming the international system to keeping the
existent international system. Reflecting this noticeable change, Chinese leader
was for the first time invited to attend a meeting of the eight highly industrialized
countries (G-8) in 2003 albeit as a dialogue member.52
New security concept
In 1997, Chinese foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed China’s new
security concept at the meeting of Asian Regional Forum (ARF). The Chinese
government stated, “Settlement of disputes through peaceful means is a proper
way to safeguard regional peace and stability, and dialogues and cooperation
are major pillars for regional peace and development.”53
China has increasingly come to realize that national security comes from
international security. Overemphasis of one’s own security and neglect of
others” security will stimulate escalation of military development in the world.54
As pointed by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan “it is necessary to foster
a new security concept that satisfies the needs of the times and to explore new
ways of maintaining peace and security. The core of the new security concept
should be mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.”55 His view
came in line with the White Paper of national defense in 2002, which stated,
“Threats to world security…have increased the common interests of countries
on the issue of security. To enhance mutual trust through dialogue, to promote
common security through cooperation, and to cultivate a new security concept
featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, have become
the requirements of the trend of our era.”56
52 Evans S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel,”China’s New diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs,
Vol.82, No.6, November/December 2003, p.32
53 Opening Statement by Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen,
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Subang Jaya, July 27, 1997 http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/
security/china/qian-arf-9707.html
54 Wang Yong, “Lun Zhongguo de xin anquanguan” (On China’s new Concept of
Security), Shijie Jingji yu zhengzhi (world Economy and politics), No.1, 1999, p.43
55 Tnag Jiaxuan, “china’s Position on Current International Issues,” Beijing review,
Vol.42, No.41, Oct.11, 1999, p.9
56 Information office of the state Council of the PRC, China’s National Defense in
2002 (Beijing: New Star Publishing House, 2002), p.5
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In recent years, Beijing has conducted a series of diplomatic efforts to
assure its neighbors as well as other countries of its peaceful intentions. It has
established an intensified program of military-to-military diplomacy with other
countries so as to ease regional concerns of China’s military modernization. For
example, China sent high-ranking military delegations to visit sixty countries
between 2001 and 2002. The members of the delegation were from the CMC, the
General Staff, General Political and Logistics Departments, and the PLAN and
PLAAF. In return, more than one hundred and seventy high-ranking delegations
from all over the world visited China.57
The diplomatic efforts made by Chinese government reveal to the world
that China has been developing toward an accommodative, cooperative, and
responsible military power. It’s increasing degree of involvement into the
international community, serves both as a restraint to its behavior and a
propelling force for it to pursue security in a collective sense. China has become
increasingly positive to the function of multilateral regimes. As Assistant Foreign
Minister Chen Jian states, “a multilateral framework seems to be the order of the
day, both in the economic and security fields.”58 With the idea that “self-help
approach alone is inadequate-as well as politically untenable-for ensuring a
peaceful and stable international environment,”59 Chinese government has
gradually come to bring its national security into line with global security
interests.
Achievements in the bilateral and multilateral relationship
In the PRC’s history of more than five decades, it experienced the changes
from ideology-guided diplomacy hostile to the West and disenchanted to the
Soviet Union and its followers, to the reemphasis on the principle of peaceful
coexistence and the dropout of the role of ideology in bilateral relations, from a
sceptic observer on the negative impacts of multilateral organizations on China’s
development to an active participant learning to fulfill its national interest
through accommodation to the regional and international institutions.
57 Ibid., pp.80-97
58 Chen JIan, “Challenges and Responses in East Asia,” text of speech delivered at the
council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Annual Meeting, Singapore,
June 4, 1997, quoted in Alastair Lain Johnston and Paul Evans, “China’s Engagement with
Multilateral Security,” in Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China:
the Management of An Emerging Power (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), p.258
59 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,”
International Security, Vol.20, No.3, Winter 1995-96, p.76
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By carrying out peaceful and friendly diplomacy in the region, China has
gradually transformed “from a country to be feared to one that beckons”60 in
the region. Especially since the Asian Financial Crisis, China has been
increasingly valued by its neighbors as an active partner in regional cooperation
instead of a threat. The neighbors have come to believe that this vital power “is
trying to please, assist, accommodate its neighbors.”61 The strengthened
interdependent economic and security interests between China and its
neighbors made China attach increasing importance to its neighborhood
relationship. As Hu Jintao said in April 2002, “China’s development would be
impossible without Asia, and Asia’s prosperity without China.”62
China’s increasing participation in other international institutions
demonstrates the same tendency of convergence. In the human rights field,
China has by far acceded to nine UN-sponsored multilateral human rights
conventions. It participates in the UN Human Rights Commission, and has
states its respect for international human rights law, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). It signed in 1997 the International
Covenant on economic, Social and Cultural Rights and in 1998 the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
In the economic field, China’s membership in global and regional economic
organizations extends together with its economic growth. The modernization
drive motivates more than ever the contacts with the global and regional
economic institutions, the help from which strengthens China’s economic
achievements and stimulates China to increasingly participate in the
international economic activities. China became a member of both the
International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group including the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRP) and the International
Development Association (IDA) in 1980, a member of the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) in 1986, and has been active since 1991 in the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). China started the negotiations for the access to the GATT
from 1986, and finally joined WTO in 2001.
In the military field, China entered the Conference of Disarmament (CD) in
1980. It joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984. It
60 Jane Perlez, “Asian Leaders find China a More Cordial neighbours,” The New York
Times, Oct.18, 2003, see http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/18international/asia/
18CHIN.html?ei=1&en=3a98924af6a7425e&e
61 Ibid.
62 quoted in Cheah Chor Sool, “We Are Good Partners,” New Straits Times (Kuala
Lumpur), April 25, 2002
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announced that it would no longer conduct tests in the atmosphere in 1986,
which is a de facto acceptance of the PTBT. It joined the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1992. As Garrett and Glaser noticed, an important shift has
occurred in Chinese perceptions of the NPT, which represents a “growing
appreciation in China of the value of arms control in enhancing Chinese
security.”63 It ceded nuclear weapon explosive testing and signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. It signed in 1993
and ratified in 1997 the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It joined the
Zangger Committee in 1997. China promulgated, respectively in September 1997
and June 1998, the Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Export and the
Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related
Technologies Export. On March 28, 2002, China entered into force the Protocol
Additional to the Agreement between China and IAEA for the Application of
Safeguards in China.
Ten years in the reform era clearly suggests a changing China, which
tends to be more cooperative and responsible. The accommodation to the
outside world was originally taken by China as a means to realize its goal of
being both powerful and prosperous. However, the commitment works as a
constraint on Chinese foreign policy. Participation into the activities in the
international society has encouraged Chinese leaders to reconsider Chinese
interests. China’s interaction with the external world modifies and complies its
behavior with others, and has been slowly eroding Beijing’s dedication to its
narrowly defined national interests. Its global and regional interests are
becoming progressively more complex, and the struggles over their definition
are becoming more protracted. China has moved towards a perception of
common interests and the acceptance of the rules and norms of the international
institutions. The calculations of national interests produce progressively more
cooperative behavior.64
Image concern has also played an important role in eliciting China’s
cooperative behavior. A responsible major power is measured in part by its
participation in the international institutions. Beijing strives to show itself as
actively involved participant in the international institutions. It stresses the
63 Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Chinese perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control,”
pp.50-51
64 David M. Lampson, “China’s Foreign and national Security Policy-Making Process:
Is it Changing and Does It Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), The Making of Chinese
Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000 (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 2001), p.36
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responsibilities of a great power shaping a stable international order, and
endorses a relationship with the outside world based on mutual interest,
cooperation, and shared long-term commitments to stability.
Consideration of the costs of commitments restrains China’s behavior as
well. As China becomes more interdependent, it becomes progressively
constrained, and the costs of withdrawal become increasingly higher. In other
words, if the PRC and its subordinate administrative units do not conform to
the norms acceptable to the international system, the investments will flow to
more congenial sites.65 Because China has defined economic modernization as
its primary goal, conformance with the international standards in the long-run
will serve China’s interests, and such gesture would put it in a favorable
competitive position to obtain capital from abroad.
After more than two decades after reform, China has found itself
increasingly market oriented and deeply involved in the international society.
The continuous interaction with the outside world is a process whereby policy
feedback simulate adaptation and learning by the initiators of policy.66 In the
process of learning, policy and behavior have been gradually modified, and the
modified behavior guided the Chinese leadership to develop broader view of
where their interests lie.67 As Samuel Kim pointed out, “Post-Mao Chinese
global learning does not have clearly demonstrated starting and ending points
in time. Instead, it can be better explained as a form of learning process itself, an
ongoing cognitive and experiential re-evaluative process in which both domestic
and external variables interact and mediate between actors’ perceptions of
national needs, interests and beliefs.”68
Conclusion
In the first two parts of the paper, we have first examined the regional
material structure of Northeast Asia, and then we have studied the changes of
China from its self-identity, its security concept, and its bilateral and multilateral
relationship, and found out that: The balance of power between the United
65 Ibid., p.26
66 Carol Lee Hamrin, “elite Politics and the Development of China’s Foreign Relations,”
in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (ed.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p.73
67 David M. Lampton, “China’s foreign and National Security Policy-Making Process:
Is It Changing and Does It Matter?” p.24-25
68 Samuel L.Kim, “Thinking Globally in Post-Mao China,” journal of Peace Research,
Vol.27, No.2, 1990, p.198
73
The Mongolian Journal of International Affairs Number 11, 2004
States in the region promotes a stable Northeast Asia. The Sino-U.S. competitive
and cooperative relationship on the one hand, reflects the clash of strategic
interests of Beijing and Washington in the fight for influence in the region; on
the other hand, shows the existence of common interests in maintaining regional
peace. With the region free from military conflicts and wars, the United States is
able to defend its shipping lanes and to promote its economic interests. Asia is
important to the United States. As the Secretary state for East Asian and Pacific
affairs says, “It is the most lucrative terrain for American jobs and exports.”69
The regional peace is of the same importance to China. A peaceful environment
is essential to China’s development. The economic reform is targeted at
“basically realizing modernization and raising China’s per capita GDP to that of
an intermediate-level developed country by the middle of the twenty-first
century, when the PRC celebrates its hundredth anniversary.”70 Without a
guarantee of a favorable external environment, it is difficult for China to fulfill
its target.
The economic goal initiated the changes in China’s foreign policy and
behavior. To be sure, China’s efforts to present itself as a responsible and
cooperative power in the international society originally resulted from the
calculation of its national interest. In Mao’s era, the Chinese government
understood that the overturning of the existed international system conformed
to China’s national interest. This interpretation led to China’s revisionist
behavior lasting from the founding of the PRC until the late 1970s. The fact that
Deng’s government put economic development as the paramount task initiated
the changes in China’s behavior from challenging the international system to
working constructively within the international framework. In order to create a
favorable context for economic development, China needs to make both bilateral
and multilateral efforts to show to the world its commitment to peace and
development
While experiencing the dramatic changes from a revisionist power to a
status-quo power, China has found a way to realize its national interest by
integrating and accommodating to the international society. The changes have
already occurred both in China’s understanding of the international politics
and its behavior will most probably further its convergence to the international
69 Quoted in Alexander A. Sergounin, “An Age of Uncertainty: Building a Post-Cold
War U.S. Security Strategy for East and Southeast Asia,”p.2
70 Qin Shi, China 1997 (Beijing: New Star Publishers, 1997), p.69
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society in the future. The deeper the involvements becomes, the stronger the
constraint to China’s behavior grows. In this process, affected by the
international pressure and China’s own aspiration, the country is moving toward
a closer convergence to the international society.
The analysis of the strategic interests of the U.S. and China leads to a
scenario of a stable and peaceful Northeast Asia. Checked by the balance of
power between the two countries, maintained by China’s effort to keep a
favorable environment for its economic modernization, and encouraged by
China’s evolution to a status-quo power, the regional security is rather promising.
